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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO.

# INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Indochina

DATE DISTR. 11 June 1951

SUBJECT Current Strategy of Democratic Republic  
of Vietnam Forces

NO. OF PAGES 2

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NO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)

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SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

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### Current Military Strategy

1. The rumor that the High Command of Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) forces has abandoned the launching of major attacks in favor of guerrilla warfare is completely unfounded. On the contrary, DRV strategy, formulated to carry out Vo Nguyen Giap's three-phase war plan\*, is based on the following three tactics:

- a. Active or progressive warfare (Van Dong Chien)
- b. Troop concentration (Phoi Hop Binh Chung)
- c. Mobile Tactics (Chien Luoc Bon Ba)

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CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the  
letter of 16 October 1978 from the  
Director of Central Intelligence to the  
Archivist of the United States.

Next Review Date: 2008

2. Current DRV strategy relies heavily on the second of these tactics and the slogan "Tap Binh Chung", which literally means the concentration of troops, is based on the Chinese General LAM Buu's\*\* strategem of staging lightning attacks by a large concentration of troops from various units, joined under a single command.\*\* In this respect, the chief of each zone is at the same time a regional commander with control over all troops entering his sector. While the DRV will continue to employ these tactics when the general counter-offensive is launched, the present attacks are still designed to destroy enemy forces while preparing for the offensive, rather than to gain ground.

### Use of Guerrilla Forces

3. The DRV has not lost sight of the value of guerrilla forces, however, and they will be used extensively to supplement the attacks of regular forces and to stage mopping-up operations to eliminate remaining enemy forces after the completion of an attack. In addition to the regular DRV forces, a guerrilla battalion, responsible to the provincial Administrative and Resistance Committee, is attached to each of the provinces in North Vietnam. In the same manner, a guerrilla company is attached to the Administrative and Resistance

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Art. 1. H.R. 71

Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RDP82-00457R007900480007-0

Date: 10/10/19

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Committee of each Huyen. Each company is armed with 1-2 heavy machine guns, 5-8 light machine guns, 30-50 rifles, plus grenades and mines.

Military Security

4. In early April 1951, Le Gian, national director of the DRV Security Service, ordered the creation of a People's Security Service, designed to maintain tighter control of DRV zones by the Communist Party of Indochina (PCI). This new organization will be composed of security agents recruited from each village and who will be supported by the village budget. A chief of post will be appointed for every 15 to 20 villages whose duties will include the training of the local agents. In this way, the PCI plans to make each villager capable of gathering intelligence for the combat troops. 25X1A

\* [REDACTED] Comment. Giap's three-phase war plan is contained in [REDACTED]

\*\* [REDACTED] Comment. General LAM Bui is possibly identical with the LAM Bui reported in [REDACTED] as a troop commander in the South China-Tonkin border area.

\*\*\* [REDACTED] Comment. This tactic was evidently employed in the recent Dong Trieu-Mao Khe offensive in which subordinate units of the various divisions were often separated from their headquarters to fight in task forces assigned to a particular front.

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